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Army outpost in Las Amates. Guerrilla plans to implement their urban terrorism program were frustrated, however, when heavy army and police security measures were imposed in the capital following the death of Col. Oliva and his young son. The guerrillas were forced to defer their plan and continued with sporadic attacks such as those mentioned above. Beyond these isolated (although somewhat spectacular) activities, the guerrillas (who are torn internally by power struggles and political bickering) have been ineffective. However, without a doubt a potential for increased terrorist activity continues to exist and could erupt should an atmosphere of public agitation or confusion (which the terrorists themselves could help foment) develop during the election process for the Constituent Assembly or subsequently, when the Assembly begins its deliberations. Political leaders who are excluded from participation in the Assembly elections are attempting to form a national front

Although it would be almost impossible for the nation's security forces to control completely a determined urban terrorist campaign, even if conducted only by a small group of well-trained people, GCG security forces (primarily the Army) should be able to prevent such activity from becoming a serious threat to stability unless the general situation were to deteriorate seriously.

2. While there are similarities between the Venezuelan and Guatemalan guerrilla and terrorist situations (the presence of reportedly well-trained subversive nuclei, the weakness of the civil security forces), there is one particularly noteworthy and outstanding difference: The Government of Guatemala has no prejudice against the use of military forces when necessary to maintain public order and would not have difficult political considerations to take into account in the use of such forces.

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